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Abstract 
 
This study aims to analyze whether external auditors’ quality and leverage affect tax 
aggressiveness.  Tax aggressiveness is one of the main issues with regard to tax compliance 
by corporations as taxpayers, particularly in developing counties such as Indonesia.  
Implementing purposive sampling approach, this study ended-up with 76 manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the 2012-2016 periods as a sample 
(i.e., 380 observations). By using OLS regression, the findings show that both external 
auditors’ quality and leverage affect negatively on tax aggressiveness in-line with the 
theoretical concept and majority of previous studies.  Therefore, this study contributes to the 
development of financial accounting and taxation research fields, particularly by providing 
empirical evidence from emerging market on the link between external auditors’ quality, 
leverage, and tax aggressiveness.   
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Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis apakah kualitas auditor eksternal dan 
leverage berpengaruh terhadap agresivitas pajak.  Agresivitas pajak merupakan salah isu 
utama yang berhubungan dengan ketaatan pajak perusahaan-perusahaan selaku wajib pajak 
badan, khususnya di negara-negara berkembang termasuk Indonesia.  Dengan menggunakan 
pendekatan  purposive sampling, penelitian ini berhasil mendapatkan 76 perusahaan 
manufaktur yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia untuk periode 2012-2016 sebagai sampel 
(380 observasi).  Dengan menggunakan regresi OLS, hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa kualitas 
auditor eksternal dan leverage berpengaruh negative terhadap agresivitas pajak sesuai 
dengan beberapa teori yang mendasari penelitian ini dan mayoritas hasil-hasil penelitian 
terdahulu.  Dengan demikian, penelitian ini berkontribusi terhadap pengembangan 
penelitian-penelitian di bidang akuntansi keuangan dan perpajakan, dengan memberikan 
bukti empiris dari negara berkembang mengenai hubungan antara kualitas auditor eksternal, 
leverage, dan agresivitas pajak.    
 
Kata Kunci: kualitas auditor ekxternal, leverage, agresivitas pajak, ketaatan pajak 
 
 
How to Cite: Suyono, E. (2018). External Auditors’ Quality, Leverage, and Tax Aggressiveness: Empirical Evidence from 
The Indonesian Stock Exchange. Media Ekonomi dan Manajemen, 33(2), 99-112. 
 
 
 
 
 
Media Ekonomi dan Manajemen, Vol. 33 No. 2, Juli 2018, 99-112 
100  p-ISSN: 0854-1442 (Print) e-ISSN: 2503-4464 (Online) 
INTRODUCTION 
Tax is a mandatory duty binding on 
all citizens as well as corporations and 
must be paid to the state. On the other 
hand, tax is the main source of income for 
most countries including Indonesia, where 
for Indonesia in the past decade the 
percentage of taxes in the state budget has 
increased up to more than 60% of the 
source of state income (Annisa and 
Kurniasih, 2012; Astuti & Aryani,  2016).  
Mansor and Gurama (2016) argued that 
taxes are generally the main source of 
income which is subsequently used to 
sustain development funding in most of the 
world, especially in developing countries 
including Indonesia. 
The fundamental problem faced by 
most countries is the prevailing 
phenomenon in which the revenue from 
tax sources is still far from the potential 
that should be because there are efforts 
from the taxpayers to do the tax avoidance 
or evasion which are considered. Eschborn 
(2010) explained that tax evasion is an 
attempt against the laws and regulations 
that exist to not pay taxes. While tax 
avoidance is deliberate efforts to minimize 
the amount of taxes that should be paid by 
looking for legal loopholes so as to imply 
their actions do not violate laws and 
regulations in the related state (Simser, 
2008; Armstrong et al., 2015). 
In other words, tax collection is often 
not maximized because there are attempts 
by taxpayers to avoid paying taxes or 
minimizing tax payments in ways they 
deem legal. So tax avoidance/evasion is a 
very basic problem for most developing 
countries, including Indonesia because it 
causes tax revenue to be not optimal. 
Moreover, taxpayers who generally make 
efforts to avoid taxes are corporate 
taxpayers whose the tax amount they try to 
avoid is significant in reducing the total 
amount of taxes they should pay to the 
state. This condition is exacerbated by the 
large number of corporate taxpayers who 
consider that the tax is a burden for 
companies that can reduce net income so 
that most companies do not pay taxes 
voluntarily. Since there are still many 
companies’ managers who think that taxes 
are a burden, many companies are trying to 
minimize the tax payment in a way that 
does not violate the law that so-called by 
tax avoidance (Kurniasih & Sari, 2013). 
One of the expectations by the 
Directorate General of Taxes in tax 
revenue is the manufacturing industries 
because this sector is the most dominant 
type of industry both in terms of the 
number of companies as well as the 
number of annual profits they generate so 
as to also contribute to the number of state 
revenue from taxes they pay. Moreover, 
the data show that the manufacturing 
industry in Indonesia experienced the 
greatest growth compared to other industry 
sectors by 4.12% in 2012 from 4.10% in 
2011 (Astuti & Aryani, 2016).  Moreover, 
in 2010, the contribution of value-added 
tax in the manufacturing sector increased 
to 46%, then jumped 60.5% in 2011 and 
increased again to 74.2% in 2012, 
meanwhile, for income tax contribution 
increased to 34.7% in 2010, 41.9% in 
2011, and again increased by 55% in 2012 
(Astuti & Aryani, 2016). Nevertheless, 
there remains a gap between acceptable 
revenue and actual tax revenues in the 
manufacturing sector either from income 
tax, value-added tax, and other taxes 
related to the manufacturing sector. The 
revenue gap is caused by the low 
compliance of tax deposits, the number of 
undocumented transactions (underground 
economy) and the tendency of tax 
avoidance (Astuti & Aryani, 2016). 
In the United States, at least one-
quarter of the company has tax avoidance 
by paying taxes less than 20% while the 
average tax paid by the company is close 
to 30% (Dyreng et al., 2008). Similarly in 
Indonesia, in 2005 there were 750 Foreign 
Investment Companies suspected of tax 
avoidance by reporting company losses for 
five consecutive years and not paying taxes 
to the state (Astuti & Aryani, 2016). 
Furthermore, in 2012 there are 4000 PMA 
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companies reporting zero taxes due to the 
loss for seven consecutive years, where 
generally the company is engaged in 
manufacturing and processing of raw 
materials (Astuti & Aryani, 2016). 
There are several factors influencing 
tax avoidance from previous studies, 
namely profitability, family ownership, 
independent board of director, audit 
committee, firm size, leverage, fiscal loss 
compensation, etc (Richardson & Lanis, 
2007; Dyreng et al. 2008). This study tries 
to be more specific to analyze two factors 
that are expected to contribute in tax 
avoidance practices that is auditor quality 
and company leverage by taking sample of 
the study from manufacturing companies 
listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
because the manufacturing companies are 
the most dominant in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange as has been explained in the 
above paragraph. 
The external auditor from the public 
accounting firm is an independent party 
that is expected to be able to increase the 
value of financial statements for its 
stakeholders through the audit activities on 
the financial statements. The external 
auditor will assess the fairness of financial 
reporting along with all existing 
disclosures by comparing them with 
generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP).  In doing the audit work, the 
auditor will also assess the reasonableness 
and validity of reporting items related to 
the company's profit which automatically 
also affects the amount of tax to be paid. 
Thus the existence of an external auditor 
will affect the aggressiveness of the 
company in making efforts of tax 
avoidance or tax evasion. Donohoe and 
Knechel (2014) argued that aggressive 
corporate tax planning efforts may increase 
the litigation risk for the auditor because it 
may be that shareholders will hold auditors 
accountable in case of a tax bill from the 
tax office due to a tax-deficit in one fiscal 
year. The tax office may prosecute the 
company as a result of the company's 
failure to comply with taxes in accordance 
with applicable law and regulations and 
this condition will have implications for 
the auditor's reputation because the auditor 
will be deemed to have failed to perform 
its duties to ensure adequate disclosure 
activities in the company's financial 
statements for not adequately disclosing 
the amount of taxes that should be paid to 
the state (Hennes et al., 2014; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
Hanlon et al. (2012) argued that the 
existence of tax planning activities that are 
too aggressive by the company will raise 
public doubts about the quality of its 
auditors because the public will argue that 
the auditor does not perform the audit 
work strictly following the professional 
standards of public accountants and not 
strictly apply the principles of professional 
ethics so that although the financial 
statements have been audited by an 
independent external auditor, tax 
avoidance or tax evasion occurred through 
highly aggressive tax planning.  In other 
words, a good auditor's reputation from 
large public accounting firms (i.e., Big 4) 
will be able to prevent overly aggressive 
tax planning practices that can be 
interpreted as a client's attempt to avoid tax 
payment.In addition to the quality of 
external auditors, this study predicts that 
firm leverage is also another factor that 
will affect the aggressiveness of companies 
in tax planning. This is because leverage 
represents the financing of an enterprise 
where debt reflects the higher value of the 
firm in which leverage is also an addition 
to the amount of debt that results in 
additional interest expense that can reduce 
the corporate income tax expense. 
Richardson and Lanis (2007) examined the 
effect of leverage and company size on tax 
avoidance and stated that the higher the 
leverage ratio the lower the effective tax 
rate (ETR) of the firm is due to the interest 
expense that reduces the tax expense.  It 
means that leverage has a negative effect 
on tax avoidance.  Richardson and Lanis 
(2007) said the bigger the company will be 
the lower ETR it has, this is because big 
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companies are better able to use the 
resources it has to make a good tax 
planning.  Some previous studies indicated 
that there is a deliberate attempt by the 
company to increase the amount of the 
debt so that the company are able to avoid 
the payment of taxes because with large 
debts resulting in the huge interest expense 
to be paid where the interest expense will 
reduce the company's profit that will also 
automatically reduce the corporate tax 
(Desai & Dhamapala, 2006; Sartori, 2008). 
Lennox et al. (2013) argued that 
companies that do tax planning aggres-
sively tend not to commit accounting 
fraud. Meanwhile, Gallemore et al. (2014) 
found no significant relationship between 
aggressive tax planning and auditor 
reputation. 
Based on the above problems, the 
purpose of this study is to: (1) analyze the 
effect of the quality of external auditors on 
tax aggressiveness, and (2) to analyze the 
effect of leverage on tax aggressiveness. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review 
Relationships among variables in this 
study can be explained by positive 
accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986) and economic regulation theory 
(Hertog, 1999). From the perspective of 
positive accounting theory, the taxes that 
companies must pay to the state treasury 
can be viewed as part of the political costs 
whereby the bigger the company will pay 
the greater political costs. This will 
ultimately lead managers to look for ways 
to minimize the reported earnings in the 
financial statements so that they can pay 
taxes at a smaller amount, which is a tax 
avoidance measure by companies. Hence 
in the concept of a political cost 
hypothesis, larger companies automatically 
have more wealth so that they will become 
political victims by paying greater political 
costs, such as by paying a larger tax 
amount which is marked by the larger ratio 
of effective tax rate ( ETR) (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). However, Siegfried 
(1972) has a different view in which he 
argued that the larger the company will 
have more resources that they can use to 
aggressively make a tax planning to 
optimize the tax savings so that the ETR 
will be even smaller. In other words, the 
smaller the ETR ratio indicates that the 
company has done a very aggressive tax 
planning that is often called by the tax 
avoidance. This means that a small ETR 
ratio indicates the amount of cash paid in 
the form of taxes to the state 
disproportionate to the amount of profit 
earned by the firm. 
Meanwhile, from the perspective of 
economic regulation theory, Hertog (1999) 
argued that the economic problem is not 
merely a transaction of profit or loss or 
effectiveness and efficiency, but concerns 
the dimensions of justice, power-sharing 
arrangements, etc. The theory of economic 
regulation means that the economy must be 
built in a certain social relations context 
where the economy is not only about 
rational choice, maximization (Pareto 
optimum) principle, transaction cost, but 
also about deep-rooted habits community. 
With regard to the tax payments by 
taxpayers, the theory of normative 
economic regulation argues that 
government will expect all taxpayers to be 
obedient and have the awareness to pay 
taxes (Hertog, 2010). However, in reality, 
not all taxpayers have the awareness to pay 
their taxes, in general, they make 
aggressive tax planning efforts to make the 
tax savings optimally by trying to pay the 
smallest amount of tax, which in turn is 
known as positive economic regulation 
theory (Hertog, 2010). 
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
External Auditors’ Quality and Tax 
Aggressiveness  
The external auditor of the public 
accounting firm plays a role in assessing 
the fairness of the financial statements 
made by the company in all aspects, in 
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terms of recognition, measurement, 
reporting, or disclosure. In carrying out its 
work the auditor will pay more attention to 
material transactions, including income tax 
expense which is generally of very 
material amount compared to net income 
before tax. Barrett (2004) argued that the 
auditor is obliged to scrutinize the amount 
of tax debt in the company's balance sheet 
and the tax expense contained in the 
income statement as well as the feasibility 
of disclosing the items relating to both 
accounts in the company's financial 
statements. Thus the auditor's professional 
duty is to examine whether there are 
unlawful tax-related transactions, which 
can minimize the company's efforts to 
conduct aggressive tax planning in the 
form of tax avoidance or even in tax 
evasion. 
The auditor has the ability to control 
or suppress the client to reduce his/her 
aggressive tax behavior because aggressive 
tax behavior has the potential to increase 
the likelihood of the client performing 
material misstatements in the financial 
statements due to the use of multiple 
accounts such as allowances for 
assessments, tax contingency reserves, 
estimated accrued taxes, etc (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010; Gupta et al., 2016). In 
addition, aggressive tax behavior may also 
be detrimental to the auditor as it will 
increase the risk of litigation when the 
government discovers a violation 
committed by the client with regard to its 
tax obligations (Heninger, 2001; Palmrose 
& Scholz, 2004). In addition, some 
previous studies have found that 
aggressive tax planning can also worsen 
the company's reputation that could 
ultimately lower the company's share price 
(Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009; Kim et al., 
2011). When It happens, it can certainly 
trigger lawsuits against auditors from 
shareholders who feel aggrieved as the 
auditor does not strictly control the 
manager to avoid aggressive tax planning 
(Francis et al., 1994). 
This study argues that the larger the 
size of a public accounting firm will be 
more reputable. Following some previous 
studies, this study argues that auditors 
from the Big 4 public accounting firms are 
more reputable than auditors of the non-big 
four (Choi et al., 2008; Francis & Wang, 
2008; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). Further 
Mansi et al. (2004) found empirical 
evidence that Big 4 public accounting 
firms were better able to guarantee the 
quality of their audits compared to smaller 
public accounting firms. So some previous 
studies documented that aggressive tax 
planning is more prevalent in firms audited 
by non-Big 4 public accounting firms than 
firms audited by Big 4 public accounting 
firms (Frank et al., 2009). Other studies 
have found several public accounting firms 
set higher audit fees when there are 
indications of aggressive tax planning by 
the clients as compensation for the 
litigation risks they may face if the 
government finds clients' mistakes with 
regard to its tax obligations (Donohoe & 
Knechel, 2014; Klassen et al., 2016 ). 
Furthermore, Lisowsky (2010) 
documented that the size of public 
accounting firm will be positively related 
to tax protection activities where in general 
the larger the public accounting firm will 
be increasingly reputable so that they will 
be obedient to the prevailing laws and 
regulations and often characterized as tax 
promoters. McGuire et al. (2012) found 
that public accounting firms providing 
audit services and tax consulting services 
simultaneously encourage increased 
aggressive tax behavior of the client. 
Based on the various arguments 
above, the first hypothesis in this study 
formulated as follows: 
H1: External auditors’ quality affects 
negatively on tax aggressiveness 
 
Leverage and Tax Aggressiveness 
The companies in the choice of their 
capital structure are enabled to use debt as 
an alternative source of external financing.  
One proxy of capital structure is leverage, 
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which is a ratio that measures how far a 
company uses debt in financing. Leverage 
also describes the relationship between 
total assets with common stock or shows 
the use of debt to increase profit.  
However, the debt will create a fixed 
interest expense, where the greater the debt 
the greater the interest payable which 
implies the smaller net profit before tax 
reported in the financial statements. In 
other words, the greater the debt will 
further reduce the taxable income because 
of tax incentives on the greater of debt 
interest. This condition often influences the 
behavior of managers in preparing 
alternative capital structures where 
managers have the initiative to increase the 
company's debt as well as the source of 
funding to minimize the tax expense. This 
condition is in accordance with article 6 of 
Indonesian Law No. 36 of 2008 stating that 
interest on loans is one type of expense 
that can be deductible in tax calculation 
(deductible expense). 
Ozkan (2001) provided evidence that 
firms with high tax liabilities will choose 
to make loans in order to get tax 
deductions, so this deliberate indebtedness 
falls under the category of aggressive 
action against taxes. Higher interest rates 
will affect the company's tax expense. The 
higher the company's debt ratio, the lower 
the company's CETR (Cash Effective Tax 
Rate) ratio (Richardson & Lanis, 2007). 
This is in line with Swingly and Sukartha 
(2015) who found that the higher the 
leverage the lower the tax avoidance that 
companies do because of the interest 
expense. The results of Richardson and 
Lanis (2007) also stated that leverage has a 
negative effect on tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, Stickney and McGee (1982) 
and Gupta and Newberry (1997) also 
found a negative relationship between tax 
avoidance with ETR and leverage. As long 
as inventory intensity is a substitute for 
capital intensity, intensive inventory of 
firms must have a higher ETR 
(Zimmerman, 1983). Gupta and Newberry 
(1997) provided evidence that firms with 
larger proportions of fixed assets have 
lower ETR due to tax incentives, while 
firms with larger inventory proportions 
have a higher ETR. 
Based on the various arguments and 
results of the previous studies above, the 
second hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
H2: Leverage affects negatively on tax 
aggressiveness. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The Sample of the Study 
The population of this study is all 
manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2012-2016 
periods, i.e., 148 companies. Then, this 
study empowers purposive method in 
sampling collection with criteria as 
follows: 
 
Variables Definition and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
As the dependent variable in this 
study is tax aggressiveness which is 
measured by using effective tax rate 
(ETR).  It is calculated with the formula as 
income tax expense divided by book 
income (Richardson & Lanis, 2007). The 
smaller ETR shows that the amount of tax 
expense paid is not proportional to the 
company's net income. This condition 
indicates that the company conducts 
aggressive tax planning in the form of tax 
avoidance. 
 
Independent Variables 
External Auditors’ Quality 
The quality of external auditors in 
this study is measured by using a dummy 
variable where the score 1 is given when 
the company is audited by the Big 4 public 
accounting firm, otherwise, the score 0 is 
given (Kanagaretnam et al., 2016; Langli 
& Willekens, 2017). 
 
Leverage  
Leverage (LEV) in this study is 
measured by formula as follows 
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(Richardson & Lanis, 2007; Farooque et 
al., 2014): 
 
LEV  = 
Long-Term Debt 
Total Assets 
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis in this study includes 
descriptive statistic, classical assumption 
of multiple regression (i.e., normality, 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and 
multicollinearity). After all the classical 
assumptions are met, multiple regression 
tests are performed by using ordinary least 
square (OLS). Furthermore, the regression 
equation in this study is presented as 
follows: 
 
TAXAG = α - β1AQ - β2LEV + ε 
 
Where: 
α  =  Constant 
β1- β2 =  Regression coefficient 
TAXAG  =  Tax Agresiveness 
AQ  = External Auditors’ Quality 
LEV =  Leverage 
ε  =  error 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The Descriptive Statistic 
The result of the descriptive statistic 
in this study is presented in Table 2. Table 
2 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
variables in this study. The results show 
the relatively high average leverage of 
sample firms with an average of 54%, 
meanwhile, the average of tax aggres-
siveness proxied by ETR is 21%. 
 
Classical Assumptions of Regression 
The results of classical assumptions 
testing that include normality, heteros-
cedasticity, autocorrelation, and multicol-
linearity show that the model in this study 
meets all of these assumptions. This study 
uses One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
for normality test as presented in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the value of Asymp. Sig is 
higher than α (0.05).  It means that the data 
in this study is normally distributed. 
Then, to test the heteroscedasticity, 
this study uses Park Gleyser test as 
presented in Table 4. Table 4 presents that 
the significant values (Sig.) of the 
independents variables (i.e., AQ and LEV) 
on the absolute residual (ABRESID) are 
higher than α (0.05).  It means that no 
heteroscedasticity problem in the model of 
this study. 
Furthermore, this study uses Durbin-
Watson (DW) test to prove the 
autocorrelation problem.  The output of 
DW test is presented in Table 5. The result 
of autocorrelation test in table 5 shows that 
the value of DW is 1.886 which is between 
the upper bound (du) and 4-du).  From the 
Durbin-Watson table, the value of DU for 
two independent variables (K) and 380 
observations (N) is 1.748.  It means that 
the value of DW test (1.886) is between 
1.746 (du) and 2.254 (4-du).  Therefore, it 
could be concluded that the model on this 
study is free from the autocorrelation 
problem. 
Lastly, to test the multicollinearity 
problem could be seen from the value of 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as 
presented in Table 6. Table 6 shows that 
the value of VIF for both independent 
variables is lower than 10.  It means that 
the model in this study is free from 
multicollinearity problem. 
 
 
Results 
The summary of regression analysis 
results in this study is presented in table 7. 
Table 7 shows that both independent 
variables in this study, i.e., auditor quality 
and leverage influence negatively on tax 
aggressiveness with a significant value of 
0.009 and 0.012 respectively which are 
lower than α = 0.05.  Moreover, Table 3 
also presents that the result of F-statistic in 
this study is 4.837 with the significant 
value of 0.000 which is lower than 0.05.  It 
means that the model on this study is fit.  
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Meanwhile, the Adjusted R Square of this 
study is 0.402.  It means that the 
independent variables of this study (i.e., 
external auditor quality and leverage) are 
able to explain the dependent variable (i.e., 
tax aggressiveness) by 40%.  In the other 
word, the rest of 60% is explained by other 
variables out of the model in this study. 
Therefore, the regression eguation in 
this study is:  
 
TAXAG  = -5.863 – 0.113AQ -0.276LEV + ε 
 
From the regression equation at 
above, it could be explained that when the 
value of external auditors’ quality (AQ) 
and leverage (LEV) is constant, thus 
TAXAG is -5.863.  Moreover, when the 
value of AQ increases by 1, meanwhile, 
LEV is constant so the TAXAG decreases 
by 0.113.  Similarly, when the value of 
LEV increases by 1 and AQ is constant 
thus TAXAG decreases by 0.276 
 
 
Table 1. Criteria in Sampling Selection 
No Criteria  
1 Manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for 2012-2016 
periods. 
148 
 
2 
Manufacturing companies that did not issue complete financial statements during 
2012-2016 periods consecutively 
(6) 
 
3 Manufacturing companies with incomplete data as required in the study respectively 
during the 2012-2016 periods 
(66) 
Number of samples 
Number of observations for 2012-2016 periods 
76 
380 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistic 
 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
AQ 380 .0 1.0 .786 .5321 
LEV 380 .390 .780 .536 .6492 
TAXAG 380 .120 .350 .210 .5070 
 
Table 3. One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
  Unstandardized Residual 
N 380 
Normal 
Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 2.6388989 
Std. Deviation .6564621 
Most 
Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute .228 
Positive .096 
Negative -.228 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.381 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .129 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
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Table 4. Heteroscedasticity Test by Using Park Gleyser. 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .832 .658   1.236 .154 
AQ -.475 .376 -.091 -.796 .237 
LEV -.165 .117 -.095 -1.326 .097 
a. Dependent Variable: ABRESID 
 
 
Table 5.  The Output of Durbin Watson test 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .580
a
 .421 .402 .500492 1.886 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AQ, LEV 
b. Dependent Variable: TAXAG 
 
Table 6. The Output of Multicollinearity Test 
Variabel Tolerance VIF 
AQ 0.782 1.011 
LEV 0.548 2,182 
 
Table 7.  The Results of Regression Analysis 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -5.683 .995   -4.381 .000 
AQ -.113 .102 -.193 -3.783 .009 
LEV -.276 .211 -.102 -2.998 .012 
a. Dependent Variable: TAXAG 
F    =  4.837     Sig. 0.000 
R    =  0.580        R Square  =  0.421       Adjusted R Square =  0.402 
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Discussion  
The first hypothesis in this study 
states that the auditor quality affects 
negatively on tax aggressiveness. The 
result of regression analysis in this study 
shows that there is a significant negative 
relationship between the two variables, so 
the first hypothesis is supported.  It means 
that when firms are audited by qualified 
auditors from the Big 4 public accounting 
firms will be better able to minimize the 
behavior of managers in tax aggressiveness 
than those firms which are audited by 
auditors from non-Big 4 public accounting 
firms. The findings of this study support 
Barrett (2004) argument stating that the 
auditor is responsible for examining the 
company's significant accounts including a 
large amount of tax expense which is 
generally significant. So when a company 
is audited by a higher-quality of public 
accounting firms, the auditor will run a 
closer inspection of the income tax account 
than what the non-Big 4 public accounting 
firms do.  This conditions will have 
implications that a firm audited by Big 4 
public accounting firms will lessen its tax 
aggressive behavior than firms audited by 
a non-Big 4 public accounting firms. 
Furthermore, the findings in this 
study are also in line with  Dhaliwal et al. 
(2004), Frank et al. (2009), Hanlon et al. 
(2012), and Gupta et al. (2016) stating that 
the more qualified an auditor (i.e., Big 4 
public accounting firms) will increasingly 
be able to control the aggressive tax 
behavior of clients because such behavior 
increases the material misstatement in the 
financial statement and also implies the 
greater the legal problems for auditor later 
in the day when the government finds the 
tax violations committed by the client.  In 
this case, the government will accuse the 
auditor of not working in accordance with 
a code of professional ethics so that the 
profession can not suppress the client not 
to behave aggressively in fulfilling its tax 
obligations to the state (Heninger, 2001; 
Palmrose & Scholz, 2004). In general, the 
findings in this study are also in line with 
some previous studies which suggest that 
the larger the size of public accounting 
firms will be more reputable so that Big 4 
public accounting firms are better able to 
prevent clients from behaving aggressively 
in their tax obligations than those non-Big 
4 public accounting firms (Choi et al., 
2008; Francis & Wang, 2008; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2010).  It is also in 
line with several studies documenting that 
aggressive tax planning is more prevalent 
in firms audited by non-Big 4 public 
accounting firms than those firms audited 
by Big 4 public accounting firms (Frank et 
al., 2009; Donohoe & Knechel, 2014; 
Klassen et al ., 2016). 
The second hypothesis in this study 
states that leverage has a negative effect on 
tax aggressiveness. The result of regression 
analysis in this study found that leverage 
has a negative effect on tax aggressiveness, 
so the second hypothesis is supported. It 
means that the findings in this study 
support the argument that the high rate of 
the company's debt will cause the company 
to pay a high-interest expense that will 
eventually reduce the tax liability in the 
current year. Thus, when the company's 
earnings decrease due to the high-interest 
expense to be paid then the opportunity of 
companies make efforts to avoid taxes will 
also decline. 
The findings in this study are in line 
with Ozkan (2001) who provided evidence 
that firms with high tax liabilities will 
choose to make new loans in order to 
reduce taxes. When a company makes 
loans intentionally to reduce the tax 
expense, it can be mentioned that the 
company is aggressive against taxes. To 
avoid the use of 100% of debt in business 
financing then should be considered as 
well the cost of debt or financial distress, 
also called cost of bankruptcy which 
causes the company cannot achieve 
optimal profit from 100% debt financing. 
Cost of bankruptcy includes direct costs in 
the form of legal costs and administration 
of corporate liquidation including 
reorganization costs as well as indirect 
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costs. The company also tends to use 
internal financing sources first, then debt 
and equity respectively. Furthermore, the 
results of this study support Richardson 
and Lanis (2007) which states that leverage 
negatively affects the avoidance of taxes. 
The higher the leverage ratio, the higher 
the amount of funding from third-party 
debt used by the company and the higher 
the interest expense arising from the debt. 
Higher interest rates will reduce the 
company's tax expense.  Therefore, the tax 
aggressive behavior will decline when the 
amount of tax is already law. In the other 
word, the company will deem not in urgent 
need to do tax avoidance or evasion when 
the company tax is low due to the high 
debt ratio in the company capital structure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study intends to examine the 
influence of auditor quality and leverage 
on tax aggressiveness in manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. By using purposive sampling 
approach, this study got 76 manufacturing 
companies as a sample during 2012-2016 
periods, so totally there are 380 
observations. The result of the analysis in 
this study concludes that both auditor 
quality and leverage have a negative effect 
on tax aggressiveness at manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
The theoretical implication that can be 
obtained from this study is that the results 
of this research can add insight and 
knowledge for the development of science 
in the field of financial accounting and 
taxation especially related to aggressive 
tax behavior by corporations as taxpayers. 
While practically, this research is 
beneficial to the Indonesian Government 
both the Directorate General of Tax and 
Financial Services Authority regarding the 
importance of the company to be audited 
by a qualified auditor because it will be 
able to reduce aggressive tax behavior 
from the corporations as taxpayers.  For 
further researchers who are interested in 
researching the same topic, can further 
develop this research model with different 
settings, population, and independent 
variables. 
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